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Abstract
Farsighted deviations are based on agents’ abilities to compare the outcome
of a farsighted deviation to the status quo. However, agents do not account
for deviations by others in case they do not change the status quo; so, they
are not fully farsighted. We use extended expectation functions to capture a
coalition’s belief about subsequent moves of other coalitions in both cases. We
provide three stability and optimality axioms on coalition behavior and show
that an expectation function satisfies these axioms if and only if it corresponds
to an equilibrium of the abstract game that is stable with respect to coalitional
deviations. We provide applications of our solution for games in characteristic
function form and matching problems.
Keywords: abstract games, farsighted stability, expectation functions, coali-
tion stable equilibrium
JEL: C71, C72
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1 Introduction
An abstract game consists of a set of states (or outcomes), agents’ utilities in each
state, and an effectivity correspondence that specifies for any two states what coali-
tions can enforce a move from one to the other. In particular, it does not specify
strategies for any player; specifically it abstracts away any strategic interaction. Put
differently, abstract games specify what coalitions can achieve, but not how. Both co-
operative and non-cooperative games can, therefore, be modeled as abstract games.
Naturally, one can use both cooperative and non-cooperative instruments to solve
these games.
Cooperative solutions of abstract games heavily rely on dominance: one state
dominates another state if there is a coalition that (i) can implement a change from
the latter to the former, and (ii) thereby achieves a strictly better outcome for all
their members. The most prominent solutions based on dominance are, arguably, the
stable set (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) and the core (Gillies, 1959). Both
these solutions make the same crucial assumptions about agents’ reasoning, namely
that agents are myopic: (a) whenever a coalition deviates to a new state, they expect
to remain in that state; (b) whenever a coalition does not deviate to a new state, they
expect to remain in the old state. That is, coalitions expect that no other coalition
will ever implement a change. While assumption (a) has already been weakened in
the literature on farsighted behavior, assumption (b) has been criticized (for instance
by Chwe, 1994), but a convincing solution has not been offered yet. This paper
attempts to do so, both in terms of a dominance relation and in terms of an equi-
librium in a non-cooperative game that is stable with respect to coalitional deviations.
Myopic behavior is a severe restriction of agents’ rationality, and the whole dilemma
comes to light if one closely investigates the stable set of von Neumann and Morgen-
stern (1944). The stable set is a set of outcomes that satisfies internal stability – no
outcome in the stable set dominates any other outcome in the stable set – and external
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stability – every outcome that is not in the stable set is dominated by some outcome
in the stable set. It is, however, possible that a state outside the stable set dominates
a state inside the stable set. According to von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944)
no coalition would implement this outside state because another coalition would im-
plement a move back into the stable set right away. This argument is surely valid
for single-payoff stable sets, i.e. stable sets in which all states have the same payoff
vector. However, what if this is not the case? Harsanyi (1974) provided the following
thought: a coalition S could deviate from a state x inside the stable set to a state y
outside, in anticipation of another coalition’s deviating from y to third state z inside.
If z is preferred over x by all members of S, then S would actually be quite happy
with this development, so there is an indirect dominance of z over x.
Chwe (1994) formalized this indirect dominance relation according to which coali-
tions only care about the final outcome of a chain of deviations. This takes care of
criticism (a) above: coalitions do not expect to remain in the state they deviate to.
Chwe’s formulation was quite successful and in the sequel a whole branch of literature
was based upon it: Xue (1998) endowed agents with expectations about each others’
behavior based on whether they are optimistic or pessimistic, Diamantoudi and Xue
(2003) consider farsightedness in hedonic games, Herings et al. (2009) apply farsight-
edness to problems of network formation, and Mauleon et al. (2011) are interested in
stable sets of two-sided one-to-one matchings when players are farsighted.
All these stable sets rely on an indirect dominance relation according to which a
state is dominated if there is some indirect dominance path to another state. However,
none of them required that this final state is in fact not itself indirectly dominated.
More recent approaches have explicitly tackled this problem. Jordan (2006) intro-
duced expectation functions for abstract games. These function specify for each state
what (unique) coalition moves to what (unique) state. If such a function is commonly
known and accepted, then coalitions know exactly what will happen after any poten-
tial move, and a dominance relation can be based on this expectation. Of course
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there should be some coherence between the expectation function itself and the dom-
inance relation it creates, in the sense that moves should only be expected if they are
beneficial. Dutta and Vohra (2017) introduce three attractive axioms an expectation
function should satisfy, and the stationary points of such a function then constitute
a form of stable set. Hence, as long as expectations are common knowledge, prob-
lem (a) above seems solved; the case of heterogeneous expectations has recently been
explored by Bloch and van den Nouweland (2017).
Problem (b), however, persists: in the model of Dutta and Vohra (2017) agents
compare the final outcome of a deviation to the status quo, making the implicit
assumption that the status quo will remain if they do not deviate. So, agents are far-
sighted enough to consider what happens if they deviate, but not farsighted enough
to consider what happens if they do not move (Chwe, 1994). The first goal of this
paper is to adapt the model of Dutta and Vohra (2017) in order to solve this issue.
An extended expectation function specifies for each state a list of coalitions and their
moves, and each coalition knows that if they don’t move, the next one will. This way
coalitions can compare the result of their move to the scenario if they do not move.
Of course, there might be different orders in which coalitions are allowed to move, and
different orders might lead to different behavior and different stationary points. Yet,
this non-uniqueness also emerges from specifying what coalition is allowed to move at
a given state, if there are more than one coalition that could move according to the
rules of the game. Hence, we might end up with different solutions, but each solution
is supported by at least one specification of how the game is being played. We impose
three axioms on these extended expectation functions and call a function rational if
it satisfies all of them. First, the only reason for a coalition T not to move out of a
state is that there is a different coalition S whose move out of this state is at least
as beneficial for at least one member of T as T ’s move. This member would basically
veto any such move and wait for S to move. Second, if a coalition does move, it must
be strictly better for all members than not moving and leaving the floor to the next
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coalition. Here, we explicitly address problem (b) by allowing a comparison between
deviating and not deviating without the assumption that the latter would maintain
the status quo. Third, if a coalition does move to some state, there is no other state
they could move to which would be strictly better for all members. All these axioms
are independent of the order in which coalitions move; however, they might be sat-
isfied for some order, but not for others. Similar to Dutta and Vohra (2017) we are
interested in the stationary points of these rational extended expectation functions.
Most criticism about dominance relations, including ours, is based on implied
irrational behavior of coalitions or players. But this problem is very natural: dom-
inance is defined in a very abstract setting without strategies, whereas the criticism
is formulated in terms of behavior and, hence, strategies. It, therefore, seems natural
to motivate a dominance relation by supporting it in a non-cooperative fashion. This
shall be the second aim of our paper. An abstract game is, essentially, a coalition
formation game, and the existing literature on non-cooperative coalition formation is
quite rich (cf. Ray, 2007). The translation of an abstract game into a non-cooperative
coalition formation game requires the specification of an extensive form, and, as Ray
and Vohra (2017) point out, the solution might then very much depend on the choice
of this extensive form.
We shall avoid this issue: instead of providing an extensive form in which play-
ers might have very complicated strategies, we endow coalitions with rather simple
strategies. A coalition’s strategy specifies for any state of the abstract game whether
they will remain there or deviate to another state for which they are effective. This
setup is very similar to Kimya (2015) who gives a non-cooperative foundation for the
model of Dutta and Vohra (2017).
The translation between coalitions’ strategies and extended expectation functions
is straightforward. Suppose an order  in which coalitions are allowed to move in
each state is given. Then for each state, one constructs a list of coalitions by selecting
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all those coalitions whose strategies specify a move out of this state, and one orders
this list according to . So, strategy profiles build a natural foundation of extended
expectation functions.
We define a best response of a coalition S as a profile of strategies, one for each
nonempty subcoalition of S, such that each proper subcoalition plays a best response,
the strategy of S is such that it would not be vetoed by any player, and S could not
implement any move that would be strictly better for all members. An equilibrium is
then a strategy profile in which each coalition plays a best response, or equivalently,
which is a best response for the grand coalition. Our main result is that an extended
expectation function satisfies our axioms if and only if it corresponds to an equilibrium
in the associated coalition formation game. Hence, we call the set of stationary points
of an extended expectation function equilibrium stable set.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We introduce some necessary notation
in Section 2. In Section 3 we describe rational expectations as proposed in Dutta
and Vohra (2017) and introduce our extended expectation functions. In particular,
we propose our axioms and illustrate how they relate to those in Dutta and Vohra
(2017). In Section 4 we illustrate the difference between the equilibrium stable set,
and other solutions proposed in the literature on abstract games. Section 5 develops
our main result, namely the non-cooperative foundation of our axioms. In Section 6,
we propose some simple applications of the equilibrium stable set.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
Let N be a finite set of players. Subsets S ⊆ N are called coalitions. For S ⊆ N
write 2S for the set of subsets of S, and P (S) for the set of nonempty subsets. An
abstract game is a tupel
(
N,X,E, (Ui(·))i∈N
)
, where X is the set of outcomes or
states, Ui : X → R is player i’s utility function over states, and E : X × X ⇒ 2N
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is an effectivity correspondence. E specifies coalitions that have the power to replace
one state by another one: for x, y ∈ X the (possible empty) set E(x, y) comprises
all coalitions that can replace x with y. We assume that E(x, x) = 2N , that is each
coalition has the option not to change the status quo, and ∅ ∈ E (x, y) if and only if
x = y.
2.2 Expectation Functions
Let
(
N,X,E, (Ui(.))i∈N
)
be an abstract game. An expectation function is a map
F : X → X× 2N with F (x) = (f(x), S(x)) such that S(x) ∈ E (x, f(x)). F describes
transitions from every state either to itself or to another state (if there is a coalition
that is effective for such a transition): f(x) is the state that is transitioned to and S(x)
is the coalition that implements the transition. We follow the standard convention
and require S(x) = ∅ whenever f(x) = x. Given an expectation function F and a
state x ∈ X, a path P = PF (x) is a finite or infinite sequence of states (x1, x2, . . .)
with x1 = x, xk+1 = f
(
xk
)
for all k ∈ N, and xk 6= xl for all k 6= l. P is terminal if
there is m < ∞ such that f (xm) = xm.1 In this case we write t (PF (x)) to denote
the terminal node of PF , i.e. t (PF (x)) = x
m. An expectation function F is absorbing
if PF (x) is terminal for all x ∈ X.
3 Rational Expectations
3.1 Rational Expectation Functions
Let F be an expectation function. We assume that players only care about their
utility in terminal nodes of F and that any terminal node is better than reaching no
1If P is not terminal, P is either infinite or cycling. In the latter case xm is the last state before
the cycle is closed.
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terminal node at all (cf. Harsanyi, 1974). So, for i ∈ N let
ui (x, F ) =
Ui (t (PF (x))) if PF (x) is terminal−∞ otherwise. (1)
If F is absorbing then ui (x, F ) = Ui (t (PF (x))) for all x ∈ X. The following prop-
erties an absorbing expectation function may satisfy have been introduced by Dutta
and Vohra (2017).
Internal Stability, I’. For all x ∈ X, if f(x) = x then for all nonempty T ⊆ N and
all y ∈ X with T ∈ E (x, y) there is i ∈ T such that ui (x, F ) ≥ ui (y, F ).
External Stability, E’. For all x ∈ X, if f(x) 6= x then ui (x, F ) > Ui (x) for all
i ∈ S(x).
Maximality, M’. For all x ∈ X, if f(x) 6= x and there is y 6= x with S(x) ∈ E (x, y)
then there is i ∈ S(x) such that ui (x, F ) ≥ ui (y, F ).
Strong Maximality, SM’. For all x ∈ X, if f(x) 6= x and there are y 6= f(x) and
T ⊆ N with T ∩ S(x) 6= ∅ and T ∈ E (x, y) then there is i ∈ T such that
ui (x, F ) ≥ ui (y, F ).
I’ ensures that if no coalition moves out of a state x, then there is no coalition that
could profit by doing so. E’ ensures that a coalition only moves out of a state x
if the terminal node is strictly preferred over x by all members.2 M’ requires that
deviations are optimal; that is, the deviating coalition S(x) has no better states to
deviate to. Finally, SM’ requires, additionally, that no subgroup of the deviating
coalition S(x) could improve by joining some other coalition instead of S(x): such a
subgroup would have no reason to support the move of S(x).
2Dutta and Vohra (2017) require that PF (x) is a farsighted objection against x. But since
External Stability is required in all non-terminal nodes of the path PF (x), this is equivalent.
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Figure 1: External stability and maximality revisited
(a) Should 1 move to b?
a (2, 2)
c (0, 4)b (1, 1)
{2}{1}
(b) Should 2 boycott a move to b?
a (2, 2, 2)
b (4, 3, 1)
c (3, 0, 1)
d (1, 4, 3)
{1,2}
{1}
{2,3}
An expectation function is called rational if it is absorbing and satisfies I’, E’, and
M’; it is called strongly rational if it satisfies I’, E’, and SM’. The set of terminal
nodes of a rational expectation function is called a rational expectations farsighted
stable set (REFS), and the set of terminal nodes of a strongly rational expectation
function is called a strongly rational expectations farsighted stable set (SREFS).
While I’ and M’ seem rather uncontroversial, E’ might be more critical: the
condition that ui (x, F ) > Ui (x) for all i ∈ S(x) makes the implicit assumption that
the players in S(x) expect the status quo to be sustained in case they don’t move.
But, putting it in the words of Chwe (1994):
This is clearly inconsistent. A coalition is farsighted enough to consider
what further moves other coalitions will make once it moves, but does not
consider what other coalitions will do if it does not move.
Example 3.1. Let N = {1, 2}, X = {a, b, c} and consider the effectivity correspon-
dence and payoffs depicted in Figure 1a. Suppose that F (a) = (b, {1}). This clearly
violates E’, as {1} reduces her payoff from 2 to 1. Nevertheless, if she stayed in a, it
is very likely that {2} takes the opportunity and moves to b, reducing 1’s payoff even
further. Hence, {1}’s move from a to b is the choice of the lesser evil. 
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In the previous example agent 1’s optimal move crucially depends on her expectation
about agent 2’s behavior if she did not move. But these “counterfactuals” cannot be
described by an expectation function.
Another, yet similar, issue arises when we inspect SM’ more closely. A move by a
coalition S is forbidden if there is a coalition T that intersects with S and that could
move to a different state y which (eventually) is preferred over f(x) by all members of
T . So, in this instance the members of T are expected to compare their payoffs from y
to their payoffs from f(x) rather than x, in contrast to the expected reasoning behind
E’.3 Moreover, it is assumed that in this case the members of S ∩ T will boycott the
move of S and instead try to implement, together with T \ S, the move to y. But is
it clear that such a boycott brings the expected result?
Example 3.2. Let N = {1, 2, 3}, X = {a, b, c, d} and consider the effectivity corre-
spondence and payoffs depicted in Figure 1b. SM’ requires F (a) 6= (b, {1, 2}) on the
grounds that 2 could, together with 3, beneficially implement a move to d. However,
if 2 boycotts b, she can by no means be sure that d will actually be implemented as
{1} might move to c instead. 
The optimal behavior in the previous example depends, again, on counterfactuals:
what happens if {1, 2} does not implement b? In the setup of Dutta and Vohra
(2017) agent 2 pays no attention to this possibility, as she assumes that she will be
able to implement d together with 3. An expectation function as defined above cannot
incorporate such expectations. In order to analyze farsighted behavior it is, however,
essential to have expectations about what happened if a coalition did not change the
status quo. We shall therefore extend expectation functions so as to incorporate these
counterfactuals in the next subsection.
3This issue of maximality has recently been tackled by Ray and Vohra (2017).
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3.2 Extended Expectation Functions
An extended expectation function is a map F that maps each x ∈ X to an ordered list(
F 1 (x) , . . . , F k(x) (x)
)
such that F l (x) =
(
f l (x) , Sl (x)
)
with Sl (x) ∈ E (x, f l (x))
for all l = 1, . . . , k(x), f l(x) 6= x for all l 6= k(x), and Sk(x) (x) = ∅. (This implies
Sl(x) 6= ∅ for l 6= k(x) and fk(x) (x) = x.) Both the length and the order of this list
might depend on x. These ordered lists allow us to incorporate the counterfactuals
mentioned above: if S1(x) did not move to f 1(x) then S2(x) would move to f 2(x).
Note that for any extended expectation function F the map F 1 is a (normal)
expectation function, which reflects the “true behavior” in each node. In particular,
F induces the path PF 1(x) for all x ∈ X. As there is no danger of confusion, we
shall simply write PF (x) to refer to this path, even if F is an extended expectation
function. In particular, for an extended expectation function F we shall write ui (x, F )
for ui (x, F
1).
In the following we adapt the axioms of Dutta and Vohra (2017) so that they
apply to extended expectation functions. It is worth mentioning, though, that with
the definition of the utility function in Equation (1), these axioms are well defined
for F even if F 1 is not absorbing.
Internal Stability, I. For all x ∈ X and all coalitions T /∈ {S1(x), . . . , Sk(x)} there
is l ≤ k(x) such that for each y ∈ X with T ∈ E (x, y) there is i ∈ T with
ui
(
f l (x) , F
) ≥ ui (y, F ).
External Stability, E. For all x ∈ X and for all l = 1, . . . , k(x) − 1 it holds that
ui
(
f l (x) , F
)
> ui
(
f l+1 (x) , F
)
for all i ∈ Sl(x).
Maximality, M. For all x ∈ X and for all l = 1, . . . , k(x) − 1 it holds that if
there is y 6= f l (x) such that Sl (x) ∈ E (x, y) then there is i ∈ Sl (x) with
ui
(
f l (x) , F
) ≥ ui (y, F ).
Internal stability is a requirement on all coalitions T that do not want to move out
of a state x: there must be a move by some coalition Sl(x), such that whatever
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change T could implement, at least one member would not agree to that change.
External stability takes into consideration our previous discussion. A coalition Sl(x)
that moves out of x compares the final outcome this move entails not to the payoff
vector obtained in x, but to the payoff vector that would be reached if the next
coalition, Sl+1(x), got to move. Maximality requires that any moving coalition moves
to an optimal state, in the sense that there is no other state they could move to which
would make all members strictly better off.
An extended expectation function satisfying I, E, and M is called rational. A
stationary point of an extended expectation function F is a state x such that f 1(x) =
x. The set of stationary points of a rational extended expectation function F , denoted
by S(F ), is said to be an equilibrium stable set (ESS). A justification for the name
will be given in Section 5, where we shall provide a non-cooperative foundation for
rational extended expectation functions.
Note that E forbids two coalitions who move right after one another to implement
the same terminal node. In this case the first coalition would simply not move at all
and instead leave the floor to the second one. However, different coalitions can make
the same move if there are other coalitions moving between them.
Example 3.3. Consider the game depicted in Figure 2. Consider F with F 1 (a) =
(b, {1}), F 1 (b) = (c, {2}), F 2 (b) = (d, {3}), and F 3 (b) = (c, {4}). This extended
expectation function4 satisfies E, although both {1} and {4} (would) make the same
move out of b. Thus, {c, d} is an ESS. 
We first show that our axioms are an appropriate adaption of those proposed by
Dutta and Vohra (2017).
Lemma 3.4. Let F be an absorbing extended expectation function. If F satisfies
I then F 1 satisfies I’; if F satisfies M then F 1 satisfies M’; if F satisfies E and
4F is uniquely defined as the effectivity correspondence E does not allow any more moves.
Throughout the paper we shall specify F only at those states x ∈ X where E (x, y) 6= ∅ for some
y 6= x, i.e. at those states for which non-trivial moves are allowed.
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Figure 2: External stability
a (3, 0, 0, 0) b (2, 2, 2, 2)
c (4, 1, 0, 3)
d (2, 3, 1, 0)
{1}
{2} {4}
{3}
k(x) ≤ 2 for all x ∈ X then F 1 satisfies E’.
Proof. Since F is absorbing, PF (x) has a terminal node for each x ∈ X. Suppose F
satisfies I, and let x ∈ X be such that x = f 1(x). If y 6= x and T ∈ E (x, y) then
ui (x, F ) = ui (f
1 (x) , F ) ≥ ui (y, F ) for some i ∈ T by I. So F 1 satisfies I’.
Let F satisfy M, let x ∈ X, and let y 6= f 1(x) be such that S1(x) ∈ E (x, y).
Then there is i ∈ S1(x) with ui (f 1 (x) , F 1) ≥ ui (y, F 1) by M. So, F 1 satisfies M’.
Let F satisfy E and let x ∈ X. If k(x) = 1, there is nothing to show. If k(x) = 2
then f 2(x) = x and ui (f
1 (x) , F 1) > ui (f
2 (x) , F 1) = Ui(x). So, F
1 satisfies E’. 
So, while an extended expectation function specifies much more than an expectation
function, the first layer, namely F 1, is an expectation function; and this function
inherits the properties I’ and M’ if F satisfies I and M. On the other hand, E’ will,
in general, not be satisfied, but this is exactly what we wanted. We close this section
by briefly illustrating that the issues raised in Examples 3.1 and 3.2 can be resolved
with this approach.
Example 3.5. Recall Example 3.1 and Figure 1a. An extended expectation function
that satisfies I must prescribe a move of {2} to c, irrespective of {1}’s move at a.
So, we either have F (a) = ((b, {1}), (c, {2}), (a, ∅)) or F (a) = ((c, {2}), (a, ∅)). An
13
extended expectation function with F (a) = ((c, {2}), (b, {1}), (a, ∅)), however, would
violate E, as in this case {1} could maintain her payoff in a by not moving (if she
ever had the chance to move).
Recall Example 3.2 and Figure 1b. An extended expectation function that satisfies
all three axioms could have F (a) = ((b, {1, 2}) , (c, {1}) , (d, {2, 3})). E is not violated
since any attempt of {2} to boycott a move from a to b would ultimately result in
c. Yet, F (a) = ((b, {1, 2}) , (d, {2, 3}) , (c, {1})) violates E as in this case 2 could
beneficially veto b and achieve outcome d. 
The foregoing examples illustrate the crucial effect of the order in which coalitions
can move at a given state. We will shed more light on this order in Section 5 where
we provide a non-cooperative foundation. At this moment we only note that it is
intrinsic to the extended expectation function F , and our axioms are independent of
it.
4 Examples
In this section we will briefly illustrate how the ESS compares to other solutions that
have been proposed in the literature and that are based on farsighted dominance
relations. Let x, y ∈ X. State y farsightedly dominates x under the effectivity
correspondence E, y f x, if there is a sequence y0, (y1, S1) , . . . , (ym, Sm), with
y0 = x and ym = y, such that for all k = 1, . . . ,m
Sk ∈ E(yk−1, yk) and Ui(y) > Ui(yk−1) for all i ∈ Sk.
Chwe (1994) adapted the stability axioms of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944)
by using this farsighted dominance relation:
Farsighted Internal Stability. A set Y ⊆ X is farsightedly internally stable if
there do not exist x, y ∈ K such that y f x,
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Farsighted External Stability. A set Y ⊆ X is farsightedly externally stable if for
every x ∈ X \ Y there is y ∈ Y such that y f x.
A set Y ⊆ X is a farsighted stable set if it is both farsightedly internally stable and
farsightedly externally stable. A set Y ⊆ X is consistent if for all y ∈ X and all
S ⊆ N with S ∈ E(x, y) there is z ∈ Y such that z = y or z f y, and ui(z) ≤ ui(x)
for some i ∈ S. Chwe (1994) shows that for any abstract game there is (with respect
to set inclusion) a unique largest consistent set (LCS). We shall use the remainder
of this section to show that the equilibrium stable set we propose in this article is
different from the farsighted stable set, the largest consistent set, and the (strongly)
rational expectation farsighted set.
Example 4.1. Consider the game given in Figure 3.5 The farsighted stable set
contains states c and d as these are terminal nodes of the game from which no coalition
can deviate. States a and b are not contained in the farsighted stable set as both are
farsightedly dominated by c. The only rational (extended) expectation function is as
follows: at state a coalition {1} is expected to stay in a while in state b coalition {2}
is expected to move to c. Thus, ESS, SREFS, and LCS are given by {a, c, d}. This
set, however, violates farsighted internal stability. 
Example 4.2. Consider the game depicted in Figure 4. We construct two different
ESS’s. First let F 1(b) = (a, {1}), F 2(b) = (c, {2}), F 1(e) = (f, {2}), and F 2(e) =
(d, {1}). Then F 1 (c) = (e, {2}) and F 2 (d) = (b, {1}) by I. Although {1}’s move at b
leads to a lower payoff than 1 would obtain in b, the expectation of {2}’s hypothetical
future behavior makes this move beneficial. So, F is a rational extended expectation
function with S (F ) = {a, f}. This ESS, however, is neither a REFS nor externally
stable as neither b nor d are farsightedly dominated.
Let now F 1(b) = (c, {2}), F 2(b) = (b, ∅), F 1(e) = (d, {1}), and F 2(e) = (e, ∅).
Then F with F 1 (x) = (x, ∅) for all x 6= b, e is another rational extended expectation
5The example is taken from Dutta and Vohra (2017).
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Figure 3: Violation of internal farsighted stability.
a (1, 1) b (0, 0) c (10, 10)
d (0, 20)
{1} {2}
{2}
Figure 4: Violation of farsighted external stability.
a (2, 0) b (3, 0)
c (1, 1)
d (1, 1)
e (0, 3) f (0, 2)
{1}
{2}
{2}
{1}
{2}
{1}
function with S(F ) = {a, c, d, f}. As in this extended expectation function there is
at most one coalition that moves in every node, the set of terminal nodes is also a
SREFS by Lemma 3.4. 
Example 4.3. Consider the game depicted in Figure 5. By I coalition {2} must
move from b to d. Hence, one rational extended expectation function is given by
F 1 (b) = ({1}, c) and F 2 ({2}, d). In this case S(F ) = {c, d}. However, {1}’s move
at b violates E’, and I’ requires {2} to move from b to d. So, at state a coalition {1}
is expected to stay in a by E’. Therefore, the SREFS is {a, c, d}. This is identical to
the farsighted stable set as well as the LCS, and could be supported as an ESS if {2}
was allowed to move before {1} at b. 
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Figure 5: ESS vs. REFS (SREFS).
a (1, 1) b (3, 0) c (2, 0)
d (0, 1)
{1} {1}
{2}
We have seen that our solution is different from those proposed in the literature thus
far. So, what do we gain from another solution? The answer comes with the next
section where we show that rational extended expectation functions are exactly those
that emerge from a strategy profile in the original game which is stable with respect
to coalition deviations.
5 Non-Cooperative Foundation
Let G be an abstract game and let ∅ 6= S ⊆ N . A strategy of coalition S is a map
σS : X → X with S ∈ E (S, σS(x)) for all x ∈ X. Denote the set of S’s strategies by
ΣS. Let σ
0 : X → X be defined as σ0(x) = x for all x ∈ X and observe that σ0 ∈ ΣS
for all S ⊆ N . To avoid trivialities and technical issues let Σ∅ = {σ0}. A strategy
profile is a vector (σS)S⊆N ∈ ×S⊆NΣS of strategies, and the set of all strategy profiles
is denoted by Σ.
5.1 Strategies and Extended Expectation Functions
A strategy profile σ ∈ Σ induces some expectations among players, namely that
each coalition moves according to their strategy. However, this expectation does not
uniquely define an extended expectation function as at any state several coalitions
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might wish to move. In order to define an extended expectation function Fσ that
corresponds to σ, we assume that at each state x coalitions are allowed to move
according to a linear order x such that S x ∅ for all S ⊆ N , where S x T denotes
that S moves before T at x. We then define Fσ (x) =
(
F 1σ (x) , . . . , F
k(x)
σ (x)
)
such
that
1. T ∈ {S1(x), . . . , Sk(x)−1(x)} if and only if σT (x) 6= x,
2. Sl(x) x Sl+1(x) for all l = 1, . . . , k(x)− 1,
3. f l(x) = σSl(x) (x) for all l = 1, . . . , k(x)− 1,
4. Sk(x)(x) = ∅ and fk(x)(x) = x.
Note that this construction is unique for any σ ∈ Σ and any order profile = (x)x∈X .
In order to keep notation simple we shall write Fσ, bearing in mind that Fσ depends
on  as well. The order profile  shall be common knowledge. It is clear that Fσ is
an extended expectation function, but Fσ need neither be absorbing nor satisfy any
of our axioms.
5.2 Better Responses
We shall now focus on strategy profiles. In order to keep notation simple, we shall
write ui (σ, x) for ui (x, Fσ). Let ∅ 6= S ⊆ N , let σS, σ′S ∈ ΣS and σ−S ∈ Σ−S =
×T 6=SΣT . Strategy σS is a better response than σ′S against σ−S at x if
ui ((σS, σ−S) , x) > ui ((σ′S, σ−S) , x) (2)
for all i ∈ S. Say that σS is a better response than σ′S against σ−S if it is a better
response at all x ∈ X with σS(x) 6= σ′S(x). The latter requirement is similar to the
definition of coalition deviations in Kimya (2015). While it seems strong at first sight,
the following example illustrates its importance.
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Figure 6: Better responses
a (1, 1) b (1, 2) c (2, 2)
{1,2} {1,2}
Example 5.1. Consider the game depicted in Figure 6 and strategy profile σ with
σS = σ
0 for all S ⊆ N . At a coalition {1, 2} could strictly improve by switching to
σ′ with σ′{1,2}(a) = b and σ
′
{1,2}(b) = c. However, if we consider only that part of the
game that starts at b, we would not claim that the coalition’s switching from b to c
is a profitable deviation, as 2 does not profit from it. So, σ′ is not a better response
than σ. 
One could argue that in above example there is no reason for 2 not to join 1 in
implementing σ′. And one could define better responses slightly differently in order
to avoid such an argument, namely by requiring that for all x ∈ X the weak version
of Inequality (2) is satisfied for all i ∈ S and its strict version is satisfied for some
i ∈ S. But we want to make our solution comparable to other notions of dominance,
and they are typically defined in terms of strict inequalities for all members of the
deviating coalition. We therefore want to stress that the proof of the next lemma
would also hold for the alternative definition.
Lemma 5.2 (One-shot deviation principle). Let ∅ 6= S ⊆ N , let σS, σ′S ∈ ΣS and
σ−S ∈ Σ−S. If σS is a better response against σ−S than σ′S then there are x∗ ∈ X and
σ∗S ∈ ΣS such that σ∗S is a better response against σ′S as well, and σ∗S(x) = σ′S(x) for
all x 6= x∗.
Proof. Let σS, σ
′
S ∈ ΣS be as defined and let x ∈ X be such that ui ((σS, σ−S) , x) >
ui ((σ
′
S, σ−S) , x) for all i ∈ S. Such x ∈ X exists by the definition of σS, and
ui ((σS, σ−S) , x) > −∞ for all i ∈ S. Let (x1, . . . , xm) be the path that is implemented
by (σS, σ−S) starting at x; that is, x1 = x, xm = t
(
PF(σS,σ−S)
(x)
)
, with F(σS ,σ−S) as
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Figure 7: Better responses and objected strategies
a (0, 0, 0) b (1, 1, 1) c (1, 3, 2)
d (2, 2, 2)
{1,2,3} {2,3}
{1,2,3}
defined in Subsection 5.1. This path is finite as ui ((σS, σ−S) , x) > −∞ for all i ∈ S.
Let h ∈ {1, . . . ,m} be such that σS
(
xh
) 6= σ′S (xh) and σS (xl) = σ′S (xl) for l > h.
Let x∗ = xh. By construction σS is a better response at x∗ than σ′S. Define now σ
∗
S
by σ∗S(x) = σ
′
S(x) for all x 6= x∗ and σ∗S(x∗) = σS(x∗). Then σ∗S is a better response
than σ′S. 
Example 5.3. Let N = {1, 2, 3}, X = {a, b, c, d}, and for all x ∈ X let x be such
that S x T whenever T ⊆ S. Figure 7 depicts an effectivity correspondence and
payoffs for all players. Coalition {1, 2, 3} is always the first coalition to move, and
irrespective of the strategy of coalition {2, 3} there is no better response than their
moving from a to b and from b to d. 6 
5.3 Objections
We have carefully avoided the term “best response” thus far, as the strategy in the
previous example has a severe caveat: player 2 has no reason to support the joint
6Given the effectivity correspondence in Figure 7, {1, 2, 3} has no choices in c and d, so the
behavior at a and b already defines a full strategy. In order to keep notation simple, we will leave
out all trivial parts of strategies in the remainder of the paper.
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move from b to d. By vetoing such a decision,7 the order  would guarantee that
{2, 3} would make their move next, achieving c with payoff 3 for 2. In order to
formalize this idea, we need a little more notation. For ∅ 6= S ⊆ N , σS ∈ ΣS, and
x ∈ X define σ0,xS by
σ0,xS (y) =
σS(y) if y 6= x,x if y = x.
Note that σ0,xS ∈ ΣS for all σS ∈ ΣS as S ∈ E (x, x) for all x ∈ X. The only (potential)
difference between σ0,xS and σS is that the former will map x on itself. We say that
agent i ∈ S objects σS at x given σ−S if σS(x) 6= x, σT (x) = x for all T x S, and
ui
((
σ0,xS , σ−S
)
, x
) ≥ ui ((σS, σ−S) , x) .
The idea behind objections is that a player will not join S in implementing σS if she
cannot profit by doing so. We say that agent i ∈ S objects σS if there is some x ∈ X
such that i objects σS at x. Say σS is objected if it is objected by some i ∈ S.
Example 5.4. Given the order in Example 5.3 the strategy of coalition {1, 2, 3} is
objected at b by player 2. 
In the definition of an objected strategy σS against σ−S at x we have imposed the
condition that σT (x) = x for all T x S. The reason is that if a coalition S were
allowed to move at x only after some other coalition T has already moved out of x,
then S’s behavior at x is (trivially) payoff-irrelevant. Nevertheless, S might strictly
benefit from σS at x if they had a chance to actually implement it. We have to
carefully distinguish between strategies that are not profitable at x (compared to
σ0S) because their implementation would not be profitable, and those that cannot be
7We make the implicit assumption here that a coalition S can implement a move from x to y 6= x
only if all members unanimously agree on it. This is a standard assumption in the literature on
dominance relations, and the consequence is that any member of S can veto any move out of x.
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implemented because of the order x. The former strategies are objected, the latter
will be investigated more closely in Subsection 5.4.
Similarly to Lemma 5.2 we next formulate a one-shot deviation principle for un-
objected better responses.
Lemma 5.5. Let ∅ 6= S ⊆ N , let σS, σ′S ∈ ΣS and σ−S ∈ Σ−S such that σ′S is
unobjected against σ−S. If σS is an unobjected better response against σ−S than σ′S
then there are x∗ ∈ X and σ∗S ∈ ΣS such that σ∗S is an unobjected better response
against σ−S as well, and σ∗S(x) = σ
′
S(x) for all x 6= x∗.
Proof. Construct x∗ and σ∗S as in the proof of Lemma 5.2. For each x ∈ X it holds
that either u ((σ∗S, σ−S) , x) = u ((σ
′
S, σ−S) , x) or u ((σ
∗
S, σ−S) , x) = u ((σS, σ−S) , x).
In the former case σ∗S is unobjected at x as σ
′
S is; in the latter case σ
∗
S is unobjected
at x as σS is. 
Note that the construction in Lemma 5.5 relies on σ′S’s being unobjected. In particu-
lar, it is not true that for all σ′S for which an unobjected better response exists, there
is an unobjected better response that deviates from σ′S at only one state x
∗ ∈ X.
5.4 Incredible Threats
As there is a fixed order in which coalitions are allowed to move, there might be a
state x and a coalition S, such that S will not have the opportunity to move at x
given strategy profile σ−S. Coalition S’s action at x will thus never be implemented
and does not affect payoffs. The following example illustrates the resulting issues.
Example 5.6. Let N = {1, 2}, X = {a, b, c} and {1} x {2} for all x ∈ X, and
consider the effectivity correspondence and payoffs depicted in Figure 8. Let σ{2}(a) =
c. In this case, {1} should play σ{1} (a) = b to secure at least some positive payoff.
And if she does so, {2}’s action at a is payoff-irrelevant, as she will never move anyway.
So, there is no better response for {2} against σ−{2}. 
22
Figure 8: What should 1 do if 2 threatens to move to c?
a (2, 2)
b (1, 3) c (0, 1)
{1} {2}
The reader will have realized that this example is closely related to the problem of
subgame perfect equilibria. The issue, of course, is that in the setup of an abstract
game there is no initial node, there is no order in which the game is being played,
and cycles are possible. So, in order to capture the idea of a subgame in this context,
we have to work a little. For x ∈ X and ∅ 6= S ⊆ N let
ES,x (x′, y) =
{T ∈ E (x
′, y) : S x T} if x′ = x
E (x′, y) otherwise.
The effectivity correspondences E and ES,x are almost identical, the only difference
being that according to ES,x those coalitions that are allowed to move prior to S
at x are not effective for any move out of x. As they have to stay in x, S can
actually implement their move. The corresponding abstract game GS,x is defined as
GS,x =
(
N,X,ES,x, (Ui(.))i∈N
)
. As the effectivity correspondence ES,x is different,
the strategy space in GS,x is different as well: denote by ΣS,x the strategy space for
this abstract game, and observe that ΣS,xS = ΣS, that is S has the same strategy space
as before. For σ ∈ Σ let the strategy profile σS,x ∈ ΣS,x be defined by
σS,xT (y) =
y if y = x and T 
x S
σT (y) otherwise.
That is, the only change between σT and σ
S,x
T lies in the behavior of T at x if T is
allowed to move before S at x: in this case T does not move out of x. Again, it is
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easy to see that σS,xS = σS for all S ⊆ N and all x ∈ X.
In some sense we can interpret GS,x as a subgame of the abstract game G. The
game GS,x allows S’s move at x to be implemented, as S is the first coalition to move.
This construction allows us to prescribe “sensible” behavior even in states where a
coalition does, originally, not move. In particular, we will later impose the condition
that σS is not only a “good” strategy against σ−S, but that also against σ
S,x
−S at all x.
This roughly corresponds to the idea of subgame perfection for coalitions.
It is worth mentioning, though, that state x might be reached more than once
as a strategy profile σ might induce cycles – a phenomenon that can not appear in
a standard dynamic game. The definition above ensures that even if x is reached a
second time in GS,x, it is again S who has to move first. That means that S can not
throw the ball back to a coalition T that would, in the original game G, move prior
to S at x.
Example 5.7. Recall Example 5.6 and Figure 8. In the game G{2},a any strategy of
{2} with σ{2}(a) = a is a better response than any strategy with σ{2}(a) = c. 
5.5 Best Responses
Defining best responses for coalitions brings the difficulty that various subcoalitions
might implement certain actions in different states. The next example illustrates this
point
Example 5.8. Let N = {1, 2}, X = {a, b, c, d}, for all x ∈ X let x be given by
S x T if T ⊆ S, and consider the effectivity correspondence and payoffs depicted
in Figure 9. Then for coalition {1, 2} it is optimal to remain in a such that {1} can
move to c and {2} can move to d. 
We are now ready to define best responses. During the preceding discussions we have
identified four requirements that one would expect: a best response for a coalition
S must be a profile of strategies, one for each subcoalition of S (see Example 5.8);
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Figure 9: What should {1, 2} do?
a (1, 1)
b (2, 2)
c (0, 0) d (3, 3)
{1,2}
{1} {2}
the strategy must be unobjected, even in those states where S will never be allowed
to actually execute their strategy (see Examples 5.6 and 5.7); there must not be
any (unobjected) better response (see Examples 5.3); and it must be optimal for
each subcoalition of S as well (see Example 5.4). The following definition puts these
requirements together.
Definition 5.9. Let ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and let the order profile  be given. A strategy
profile σP (S) is a best response against σ−2S if
1. for each x ∈ X strategy σS is unobjected against σS,x−S at x in the game GS,x,
2. for each x ∈ X and each τS ∈ ΣS that is a better response than σS against σS,x−S
at x in the game GS,x there is i ∈ S who objects τS,
3. σT is a best response for all ∅ 6= T ( S.
The following example illustrates how best responses might depend on .
Example 5.10. Recall Example 5.8 and Figure 9. If {1} moves before {1, 2} at a
then σ{1,2}(a) = b a tribute to Condition 3 in Definition 5.9. 
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5.6 Equilibrium
Definition 5.11. Let the order profile  be given. A strategy profile σ is an equilib-
rium (with respect to ) if for all nonempty coalitions S the profile σP (S) is a best
response against σ−2S .
Recall that the definition of best responses is recursive: a coalition’s best response
contains best responses for each subcoalition. So, we obtain the following characteri-
zation of equilibria which is mainly stated for later reference and does not require a
proof.
Proposition 5.12. The following are equivalent:
1. σ is an equilibrium.
2. σ is a best response for N .
3. for each x ∈ X and each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N strategy σS is unobjected against σS,x−S at x
in the game GS,x, and for each τS ∈ ΣS that is a better response against σS,x−S at
x in the game GS,x there is i ∈ S who objects τS.
As best responses depend on, so do equilibria and the outcome of the game. We now
come to our main result that connects equilibria and rational expectation functions.
Theorem 1. An extended expectation function F is rational if and only if there are
an order profile  and an equilibrium σ with respect to  such that F = Fσ.
Proof. Let  be an order profile, let σ be an equilibrium with respect to  and let
F = Fσ. We prove that F satisfies I. Assume this were not the case. Then there are
x ∈ X and T ∈ 2N \ {S1 (x) , . . . , Sk(x) (x)} such that for each l = 1, . . . , k(x) there
is y ∈ X with T ∈ E (x, y) and ui (y, F ) > ui
(
f l (x) , F
)
for all i ∈ T . Let T and x
as described, let l ∈ {1, . . . , k(x)} be the minimal number with T x Sl(x) (this is
well-defined as T x ∅ = Sk(x)), and let y be such that ui (y, F ) > ui
(
f l (x) , F
)
for
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all i ∈ T . Consider the game GT,x, recall that ΣT,xT = ΣT , and let σ′T ∈ ΣT be defined
by
σ′T (x
′) =
σT (x) if x
′ 6= x,
y otherwise.
Clearly, σ′T is a better response against σ
T,x
−T at x than σT . As σ is an equilibrium,
σ′T must be objected (otherwise σP (T ) would not be a best response). As σ
′
T and σT
coincide everywhere except x, and since σT is not objected, σ
′
T can only be objected in
some z ∈ X with x ∈ PF (z). For such z it holds that ui
((
σ′T , σ
T,x
−T
)
, z
)
= ui (y, F ).
Moreover, ui
((
σT , σ
T,x
−T
)
, z
)
= ui
((
σT , σ
T,x
−T
)
, x
)
= ui
(
f l (x) , F
)
by construction.
Since σ′T is objected at z and σT is not, there is i ∈ T with
ui
((
σT , σ
T,x
−T
)
, x
)
= ui
(
f l (x) , F
)
< ui (y, F )
= ui
((
σT , σ
T,x
−T
)
, y
)
= ui
((
σ′T , σ
T,x
−T
)
, x
)
= ui
((
σ′T , σ
T,x
−T
)
, z
)
≤ ui
((
σ0,zT , σ
T,x
−T
)
, z
)
< ui
((
σT , σ
T,x
−T
)
, z
)
= ui
((
σT , σ
T,x
−T
)
, x
)
,
where the first two (in)equalities have been elaborated before, and the remaining
ones (in that order) hold because of the definition of F , the construction of σ′T , the
definition of z, σ′T ’s being objected at z, σT ’s being unobjected at z, and again the
definition of z. But the overall inequality is impossible. Hence, such y cannot not
exist. That means that F satisfies I.
We next prove that F satisfies E. Assume this were not the case. Then there
are x ∈ X and l ≤ k(x) − 1 such that ui
(
f l+1(x), F
) ≥ ui (f l(x), F) for some i ∈
Sl(x). By definition, ui
(
f l(x), F
)
= ui
((
σSl(x), σ
Sl(x),x
−Sl(x)
)
, x
)
and ui
(
f l+1(x), F
)
=
ui
((
σ0,x
Sl(x)
, σ
Sl(x),x
−Sl(x)
)
, x
)
. Hence,
ui
((
σ0,x
Sl(x)
, σ
Sl(x),x
−Sl(x)
)
, x
)
= ui
(
f l+1(x), F
)
≥ ui
(
f l(x), F
)
= ui
((
σSl(x), σ
Sl(x),x
−Sl(x)
)
, x
)
,
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which means that σSl(x) is objected at x by i. This contradicts σ’s being an equilib-
rium. So, F satisfies E.
We prove that F satisfies M. Assume this were not the case. Then there are
x ∈ X, l ∈ {1, . . . , k(x)− 1}, and y ∈ X such that Sl(x) ∈ E (x, y), f l (x) 6= y, and
ui (y, F ) > ui
(
f l (x) , F
)
for all i ∈ Sl(x). Define σ′
Sl(x)
by
σ′Sl(x)(x
′) =
σSl(x)(x
′) if x′ 6= x
y if x′ = x.
Clearly, σ′
Sl(x)
is a better response than σ′
Sl(x)
against σ
Sl(x),x
Sl(x)
. Hence, as σ is an equilib-
rium, σ′
Sl(x)
must be objected. As σ′
Sl(x)
and σSl(x) coincide everywhere except x, and
since σSl(x) is not objected, σ
′
Sl(x)
can only be objected at some z ∈ X with x ∈ PF (z).
In particular, ui
((
σSl(x), σ
Sl(x),x
−Sl(x)
)
, z
)
= ui
((
σSl(x), σ
Sl(x),x
−Sl(x)
)
, x
)
= ui
(
f l (x) , F
)
and
ui
((
σ′
Sl(x)
, σ
Sl(x),x
−Sl(x)
)
, z
)
= ui (y, F ). Since σ
′
Sl(x)
is objected at z and σSl(x) is not,
there is i ∈ Sl(x) with
ui
((
σSl(x), σ
Sl(x),x
−Sl(x)
)
, x
)
= ui
(
f l (x) , F
)
< ui (y, F )
= ui
((
σ′Sl(x), σ
Sl(x),x
−Sl(x)
)
, z
)
≤ ui
((
σ0,z
Sl(x)
, σ
Sl(x),x
−Sl(x)
)
, z
)
< ui
((
σSl(x), σ
Sl(x),x
−Sl(x)
)
, z
)
= ui
((
σSl(x), σ
Sl(x),x
−Sl(x)
)
, x
)
,
where the weak inequality follows from σ′
Sl(x)
’s being objected at z, and the last
strict inequality follows from σSl(x)’s not being objected. But the overall inequality
is impossible. This proves that F satisfies I, E, and M. So, F is rational.
Let now F be a rational extended expectation function. Define σ by
σS(x) =
f
l(x) if S = Sl(x) for some l = 1, . . . , k(x)
x otherwise.
For x ∈ X define x such that
1. S x ∅ for all S ⊆ N ,
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2. Sl(x) x Sl+1(x) for all l = 1, . . . , k(x)− 1,
3. for S ∈ 2N \ (S1(x), . . . , Sk(x)) it holds that Sl−1(x) x S x Sl(x) where l is
the minimal number such that for all y ∈ X there is i ∈ S with ui
(
f l(x), F
) ≥
ui (y, F ). (If l = 1 let S  S1(x).)
Since F satisfies I, such x exists for all x ∈ X. We show that σ is an equilibrium
with respect to , i.e. that σP (S) is a best response against σ−2S for all S ⊆ N . Let
∅ 6= S ⊆ N . By Proposition 5.12 it is sufficient to show that σS is unobjected against
σS,x−S in the game G
S,x for all x ∈ X, and that each τS ∈ ΣS that is a better response
against σS,x−S in the game G
S,x is objected. We first show that σS is unobjected for all
x ∈ X. If x is such that S 6= Sl(x) for all l = 1, . . . , k(x), there is nothing to show as
σS(x) = x = σ
0
S(x). If S = S
l(x) for some l then σS(x) = f
l(x), and by E it holds
that
ui (σ, x) = ui
(
f l(x), F
)
> ui
(
f l+1(x), F
)
= ui
((
σ0,xS , σ−S
)
, x
)
for all i ∈ S. Hence, σS is not objected at any x ∈ X.
Next we show that there is no unobjected better response. Assume on the contrary
that there are x ∈ X, S ⊆ N , and σ′S ∈ ΣS such that σ′S is an unobjected better
response against σS,x−S in G
S,x. As σS is unobjected, by Lemma 5.5 we can assume
without loss of generality that there is x∗ ∈ X such that σ′S(x) = σS(x) for all x 6= x∗,
and ui ((σ
′
S, σ−S) , x
∗) > ui ((σS, σ−S) , x∗) for all i ∈ S. Let y = σ′S(x∗) 6= σS (x∗) and
note that S ∈ E (x∗, y). Assume first that S = Sl(x∗) for some l = 1, . . . , k (x∗)− 1.
Then f l (x∗) = σS (x∗) 6= y, so by M there is i ∈ S with
ui ((σS, σ−S) , x∗) = ui
(
f l (x∗) , F
) ≥ ui (y, F )
= ui ((σ
′
S, σ−S) , x
∗) > ui ((σS, σ−S) , x∗)
which is impossible. So, assume that S 6= Sl (x∗) for all l = 1, . . . , k (x∗). By the
definition of x∗ there are l ≤ k(x∗) and i ∈ S such that ui
((
σ0,x
∗
S , σ
S,x∗
−S
)
, x∗
)
=
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x for x ∈ {b, e} ESS
{1} b {2}, {1} e {2} {a, f}
{1} b {2}, {2} e {1} {a, f}
{2} b {1}, {2} e {1} {a, f}
{2} b {1}, {1} e {2} {a, c, d, f}
Table 1: Order dependent equilibrium stable sets.
ui
(
f l (x∗) , F
)
and ui
(
f l (x∗) , F
) ≥ ui (y, F ). Hence,
ui
((
σ0,x
∗
S , σ
S,x∗
−S
)
, x∗
)
≥ ui (y, F ) = ui
((
σ′S, σ
S,x∗
−S
)
, x∗
)
> ui
((
σ0,x
∗
S , σ
S,x∗
−S
)
, x∗
)
,
where the last inequality holds as σ′S is unobjected against σ
S,x∗
−S at x
∗. But this is
impossible. Thus, σ is an equilibrium. 
Example 5.13. Recall Example 4.2 and Figure 4. Depending on the order of moves in
b and d we derive different equilibria and, hence, different rational extended expecta-
tion functions. Table 1 contains all four different order profiles and the corresponding
ESS’s. 
6 Applications
6.1 Absorbing Extended Expectation Functions
Players’ utilities from an extended expectation function with non-terminal paths are
lower than in any potential state. So, it is never in a coalition’s interest to close a
cycle or (if X is infinite) play a strategy that leads to an infinite path. We can use
this observation to prove the following Corollary.
Corollary 6.1. Every rational extended expectation function is absorbing.
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Proof. Let F be rational. Then there is an equilibrium such that F = Fσ by Theorem
1. Assume that there is x ∈ X such that PF (x) is non-terminal. Define strategy
profiles σ1, . . . , σk(x)−1 by
σlT (y) =
y if y = x and T = S
l′(x) for some l′ = 1, . . . , l
σT (y) otherwise.
Let l be the minimal integer such that the path PF
σl
(x) is terminal. Such l exists
as PF
σk(x)−1
(x) = (x). Let S = Sl(x) and note that σl−S = σ
S,x
−S and σ
l
S = σ
0,x
S . By
construction
ui
((
σ0,xS , σ
S,x
−S
)
, x
)
= ui
(
σl, x
)
= Ui
(
t
(
PF
σl
(x)
))
> −∞ = ui
((
σS, σ
S,x
−S
)
, x
)
.
But this means that σS is objected against σ−S, in contradiction to σ’s being an
equilibrium. 
6.2 Single-Payoff Equilibrium Stable Sets
A set Y ⊆ X is a single-payoff set if Ui (y) = Ui (y′) for all y ∈ Y and all i ∈ N .
Dutta and Vohra (2017) provide a detailed analysis of single-payoff SREFS’s. We
show that they actually coincide with single-payoff ESS’s.
Theorem 2. Let Y ⊆ X be a single-payoff set. Then Y is an ESS if and only if Y
is a SREFS.
Proof. Let Y be a single-payoff ESS, and let F be a rational extended expectation
function with S(F ) = Y . As each player’s payoffs are identical across all elements of
Y , and as F satisfies E, at each x ∈ X there is at most one non-empty coalition that
deviates from x to some z ∈ X \ {x}. Hence, k(x) ≤ 2 for all x ∈ X. By Lemma 3.4
the expectation function F 1 satisfies I’, E’, and M’. As the stationary points of F
and F 1 are identical, Y is a REFS. By Theorem 1 in Dutta and Vohra (2017), Y is
a SREFS.
31
Suppose now that Y is a SREFS. Let F ′ be a rational expectation function with
Y as the set of stationary points, and let F be the extended expectation function
with F 1(x) = F ′(x) for all x ∈ X and F 2 (x) = (x, ∅) for all x ∈ X \ Y . Clearly,
S (F ) = Y . We show that F satisfies I, E, and M. Assume first that F does not satisfy
I. Then there are x, x′ ∈ X and T ∈ E (x, x′) such that ui (x′, F ) > ui
(
f l (x) , F
)
for l = 1, 2 and all i ∈ T . Let y = t (PF (f l(x))) and y′ = t (PF (x′)) and note that
y, y′ ∈ Y . (The former exists as F ′ is absorbing and k(x) ≤ 2 for all x ∈ X.) Then
Ui (y
′) = ui (x′, F ) > ui (x, F ) = Ui (y) = Ui (y′). This, however, is impossible. So, F
satisfies I. As k(x) ≤ 2 for all x ∈ X, conditions M and E of F are equivalent to M’
and E’ of F ′. 
6.3 Characteristic Function Form Games
A game in characteristic function form (with player set N) is a map V that maps each
nonempty S ⊆ N to a comprehensive, closed, and convex set V (S) ⊆ RS. Ray and
Vohra (2015) associate with such a game V an abstract game
(
N,X,E, (Ui(.))i∈N
)
:
a state x ∈ X is a pair (v(x), pi(x)) of a partition pi(x) of the player set, and a utility
vector v(x) with vS(x) ∈ V (S) for all S ∈ pi(x). The utility function Ui is simply
defined as Ui (x) = vi(x). The effectivity correspondence E satisfies the following two
conditions:
(i) If T ∈ E (x, y), S ∈ pi(x), and S ∩ T = ∅ then S ∈ pi(y) and vS (y) = vS (x).
(ii) For each x ∈ X, T ⊆ N , and each weakly Pareto efficient v ∈ V (T ) there is
y ∈ X such that T ∈ E (x, y), T ∈ pi(y), and vT (y) = v.
Condition (i) ensures that a deviating coalition T cannot affect the partition or the
payoffs in coalitions it does not intersect with at state x. Condition (ii) ensures that
coalition T can, from any state x, deviate to a state with T as a member of the
partition and v as payoff vector for T , as long as v is feasible and weakly Pareto
efficient for T .
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Corollary 6.2. Let V be a game in characteristic function form, and let G be an
abstract game that satisfies Conditions (i) and (ii). If Y is a single-payoff ESS with
payoff vector v ∈ RN then v lies in the coalition structure core of V .
Proof. By Theorem 2 any single-payoff ESS is a single-payoff SREFS. By Theorem 2
in Ray and Vohra (2015) this is the case if and only if v is separable, so v must lie in
the coalitions structure core of V . 
6.4 Matching
We consider two-sided one-to-one matching problems. Let W be a set of women, M
be a set of men, and N = W ∪M . For each i ∈ W let ′i be a strict preference order
over M ∪ {i}, and for j ∈ M let ′j be a strict preference order over M ∪ {j}. A
matching is a map µ : N → N such that µ(i) ∈M ∪{i} for all i ∈ W , µ(j) ∈ W ∪{j}
for all j ∈ M , and µ (µ(i)) = i for all i ∈ N . If µ(i) = i then i is single, otherwise i
is matched to µ(i). A matching µ is individually rational if µ(i) ′i i for all i ∈ N . A
pair (i, j) ∈ W ×M blocks a matching µ if j ′i µ(i) and i ′j µ(j). A matching µ is
stable if it is individually rational and not blocked by any pair.
Let M be the set of all matchings, and define each player i’s preference i over
M by µ i µ′ if and only if µ(i) ′i µ′(i). Define an effectivity correspondence
E :M×M→ 2N by
E (µ, µ′) =
S ⊆ N : {i, µ′(i)} ⊆ S whenever µ′(i) /∈ {i, µ(i)}, and{i, µ(i)} ∩ S 6= ∅ whenever µ′(i) = i 6= µ(i)
 .
That is, E (µ, µ′) contains all those coalitions S whose members can transform µ into
µ′ via deleting old and forming new links. The tupel
(
N,M, E, (i)i∈N
)
forms an
abstract game.8
Corollary 6.3. Let µ ∈ M. Then µ is a stable matching if and only if {µ} is an
ESS of the abstract game.
8As M is finite i is equivalent to an ordinal utility function.
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Proof. Theorems 1 and 2 in Mauleon et al. (2011) show that µ is stable if and only
if {µ} is a farsighted stable set. Theorem 1 of Dutta and Vohra (2017) shows that
any single-payoff farsighted stable set is a SREFS, and any single-payoff SREFS is a
farsighted set. Hence, our Theorem 2 completes the proof. 
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